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Abstract
is paper considers a general equilibrium model of a competitive market economy in which
production is conducted through an endogenous social division of labour. We represent economic
decision makers as “consumer-producers”, who consume as well as produce commodities. In
this approach, the emergence of a non-trivial social division of labour is guided by Increasing
Returns to Specialisation in production.
is paper investigates the properties of equilibria in economies satisfying Increasing Returns
to Specialisation. We show that a perfectly competitive price mechanism induces a dichotomy
of production and consumption at the level of the individual consumer-producer. In this context,
under Increasing Returns to Specialisation, we show existence of competitive equilibria, the two
fundamental theorems of welfare economics, and characterise these equilibria. Under certain
conditions, markets are equilibrated through the adjustment of the social division of labour;
therefore, prices are objectively determined by the production technologies on the supply side
of the economy only.
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1 Specialisation and the social division of labour
One of the oldest ideas explaining the human process of economic wealth creation is that this occurs
through a functional social division of labour supported by a universal trade mechanism (Plato,
380 BCE; Aristotle, 350 BCE). As Smith (1776) already put forward, wealth creation in an economy
with a social division of labour results from the interplay of two fundamental principles: (a) there
are Increasing Returns to Specialisation and (b) full exploitation of these returns is possible through
the principle of Mutual Gains From Trade. e emerging social division of labour not only acts as
the main source of economic wealth creation, it also acts as an allocation mechanism. is paper
investigates both aspects of the social division of labour in the context of a competitive market
economy in which the law of one price is imposed on all production and trading processes.
e principle that human capital is more productive if fully specialised in the execution of a
limited set of tasks or the production of a limited set of closely related commodities has not yet been
explored fully in contemporary general equilibrium theory. is paper proposes formal descriptors
of the property of Increasing Returns to Specialisation (IRSpec) that captures this fundamental idea.
is conception compares to the notion of Increasing Returns to Scale (IRS), which has been the
focus of research in general equilibrium approaches to economic wealth generation.
We show in this paper that the property of Increasing Returns to Specialisation supports the
two fundamental functions of a social division of labour, namely the generation of economic wealth
and the allocation of that generated wealth. Indeed, specialised economic agents interact through a
competitive price mechanism that acts as a coordination device in the process of economic wealth
creation as well as a mechanism to allocate the generated wealth through the social division of
labour. To pursue this, we apply the approach developed in Yang (1988) and Yang and Ng (1993).1
is framework represents an economic decision maker as a “consumer-producer”, who is endowed
with consumptive as well as productive abilities. Yang presented this approach as an alternative to
the formal (social) dichotomy of consumption and production that is at the centre of the Walrasian
theory of a market economy.
However, the concept of Increasing Returns to Specialisation remains relatively unexplored
in formal general equilibrium models based on the notion of a consumer-producer. Previously,
Sun, Yang, and Zhou (2004) formalised a general equilibrium framework founded on the models of
Yang (1988, 2001, 2003) and Yang and Ng (1993). In this framework, production sets of individual
consumer-producers are typically bounded as well as non-convex. ese authors restrict their
model to one based on home-based production only and investigate the existence of competitive
equilibrium under well-specied transaction costs. is model omits the explicit formulation of
either Increasing Returns to Scale or Increasing Returns to Specialisation and, as a result, does not
investigate the consequences of these fundamental hypotheses. Also, the focus on home-based
production excludes the trade of intermediary inputs as part of social production processes, an
essential feature of general equilibrium models of production economies. In the present paper we
try to address these omissions.
1Alternative explorations to model the idea of wealth creation through a social division of labour have been presented
in, e.g., Young (1928); Stigler (1951); Blitch (1983); Kim (1989); Locay (1990) and Nakahashi and Feldman (2014). For a
complete overview we also refer to Steinegger (2010) and Sun (2012).
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Our model and its main insights. We focus on the formalisation of the idea of Increasing
Returns to Specialisation (IRSpec) at the level of the individual consumer-producer. A production
set satises the IRSpec property if it is contained in the convex hull of production plans in which
there is full specialisation in the production of a single commodity, subject to the free-disposal
hypothesis in production. As mentioned above, Plato (380 BCE); Smith (1776); Yang (2001); Yao
(2002) and Diamantaras and Gilles (2004) have hinted at this property, but it has not been formalised
and developed further in the existing literature on mathematical models of market economies.
We extend the framework of Yang (1988); Yang and Ng (1993); Yang (2001) and Sun, Yang, and
Zhou (2004) by assigning more general production sets, describing production plans founded on
inputs and outputs, going beyond the limitations of home-based production only. is bridges this
approach and the notion of a coalition-production economy (Hildenbrand, 1968, 1974). Furthermore,
we abstract from transaction costs, thereby clarifying the pure eects of the properties of the
consumer-producers’ productive abilities we model. In the seing of this general model we oer a
number of standard insights.
First,we establish that the competitive price mechanism induces a dichotomy between production
and consumption decisions at the level of the individual consumer-producer (eorem 2.6). Hence,
the consumer-producer maximises her income through the selection of an optimal production plan
and uses the generated income to acquire a preference-optimising consumption bundle.
Second, under IRSpec, individual consumer-producers specialise fully in the production of a single
commodity as a consequence of the dichotomy between consumption and production decisions
under a competitive price mechanism (eorem 2.9). is simplies signicantly the insights of Yao
(2002) and Diamantaras and Gilles (2004).
ird, in a continuum economy under standard assumptions on preferences and the boundedness
of the production sets, we show that IRSpec implies the existence of a Walrasian equilibrium with
strictly positive prices (eorem 3.6). is existence result compares to the existence results estab-
lished for coalition production economies (Hildenbrand, 1968, 1974; Sondermann, 1974; De Simone,
1997) and for economies with consumer-producers (Sun, Yang, and Zhou, 2004).2
Finally, we establish the two fundamental theorems of welfare economics for the formulated
equilibrium concept. e rst welfare theorem (eorem 3.3) reects a Smithian “invisible hand”
that a competitive price guides consumer-producers to a socially optimal “role”—represented by a
well-formulated production plan—in an optimally functioning social division of labour. We show that,
under standard conditions, every Pareto optimal conguration consisting of an allocation and an
assignment of production plans is supported as a quasi-equilibrium through a well-chosen lump-sum
wealth transfer system (eorem 3.4 (a)). Moreover, under IRSpec, every Pareto optimal conguration
is supported as a full competitive equilibriumwith strictly positive prices for a well-chosen lump-sum
wealth transfer system (eorem 3.4 (b)).
Further research should identify how these insights are modied if trade is subject to transaction
costs. In particular, the interplay between Increasing Returns to Specialisation (IRSpec) and the
presence of transaction costs should be investigated.
2We emphasise that our existence result is fundamentally dierent from the ones established by Suzuki (1995) and
Toda (2002), who consider economies with non-convex consumption sets.
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e social division of labour as an allocation mechanism. e results established for a con-
tinuum economy with consumer-producers focus mainly on the endogenous emergence of a social
division of labour. erefore, these insights address the wealth creation processes in such an econ-
omy as much as the allocation of the generated wealth through that social division of labour. ere
is a further consequence to the IRSpec property in such an economy.
Indeed, IRSpec implies that besides equilibration through the price mechanism—as traditionally
understood in Walrasian general equilibrium theory—there might arise equilibration through the
endogenous adaptation of the social division of labour (eorems 4.3 and 4.8). We show that this
occurs in economies in which there are uniform production standards under full specialisation—
resulting into equivalent specialised abilities. In particular in these cases, the market prices are
completely determined by the productive abilities of the consumer-producers in the economy and
are as such independent of the demand side in the market system.
erefore, under these conditions, free mobility and costless assumption of specialised roles
in the social division of labour imply that competitive pressures equilibrate generated incomes as
well as adjust the social division of labour to meet global market demand. is results in a fair
allocation in which no agent envies any other (Corollary 4.4). Furthermore, equilibrium prices
are fully determined by the production technologies in the economy—akin to a similar insight
established for a Leontief economy with constant returns to scale.
Our notion of an economy with an endogenous social division of labour also encapsulates some
aspects of production under Increasing Returns to Scale. However, our treatment of production is
rather dierent from the models implementing Increasing Returns to Scale (Brown, 1991). Instead
of considering the social organisation of production in “rms”, our framework embeds production
in a social division of labour that is fully atomised. Indeed, all economic agents are negligible
consumer-producers and are endowed with exible productive abilities. Natural limitations of
human ability now imply that these individual production sets are possibly non-convex, but always
bounded. is allows for a classical treatment of decision making with regard to production and the
restoration of competitive equilibrium, even if individual production sets are non-convex.
Relationship to theories of economic growth. Recently, there has been a surging interest in
the eects of increasing returns in wealth creation from new growth theory (Romer, 1986, 1987) to
new international trade theory (Krugman, 1981, 1991, 2008; Gandolfo, 2014). None of these theories
were developed within the context of a general equilibrium model of an economy with production
subject to Increasing Returns to Specialisation (IRSpec). However, our work indicates that the
properties debated in these theories can be implemented in the seing of a general equilibrium
theory of an economy with consumer-producers.
New growth theory emerged from classical growth theory by taking account of innovation and
Increasing Returns to Specialisation through modication of a standard Cobb-Douglas formulation
of a production function. It has been shown by Yang and Borland (1991) and Yang and Ng (1993)
that the general equilibrium framework founded on the modelling of agents as consumer-producers
can be employed successfully to explain endogenous economic growth. An enhancement of the
Yang-Borland model to incorporate IRSpec would make this link more explicit.
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New international trade theory has been founded on the incorporation of the modern approach
to monopolistic competition developed by Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) to explain international trade by
similarly developed countries. Our framework of an economy with multiple specialisation types
(Denition 4.2) provides a general equilibrium framework to analyse international trade paerns
between countries with dierent institutional governance structures. It clearly explains how similarly
developed, advanced countries can establish non-trivial trade and the generation of signicant wealth
through the interplay of Increasing Returns to Specialisation (IRspec) and gains from (international)
trade that is founded on perfect competition rather than monopolistic competition. We emphasise
that this explanation is Smithian in nature rather than Ricardian (Buchanan and Yoon, 2002).
Outline of the paper. In Section 2 we set up the model of a consumer-producer and introduce
formalisations of the notion of Increasing Returns to Specialisation (IRSpec). We investigate the
dichotomy of consumption and production decisions at the level of the individual consumer-producer.
We introduce two closely related formalisations of IRSpec. We subsequently show that, under IRSpec,
production is normally fully specialised in a single output, conrming the insights of Yao (2002) and
Diamantaras and Gilles (2004) without transaction costs.
In Section 3 we introduce a competitive equilibrium concept for which we establish the two
fundamental theorems of welfare economics. Furthermore, we establish the existence of a competitive
equilibrium under Increasing Returns to Specialisation.
Section 4 explores equilibration through the adjustment of the endogenous social division of
labour. We show that this occurs if consumer-producers have equivalent productive standards under
full specialisation.
All proofs of the main results are collected in the appendices.
2 Consumer-producers
Our approach is founded on the hypothesis that all agents participate directly in the production as
well as the consumption of all economic commodities.
We consider ` > 2 marketable commodities. e `-dimensional Euclidean space R` now
represents the commodity space and the consumption space is its nonnegative orthant R`+. For
k = 1, . . . , ` we denote by ek = (0, . . . , 0, 1, 0, . . . , 0) the k-th unit vector in R`+ and by e = (1, . . . , 1)
the bundle consisting of one unit of each commodity. roughout, we use the notational convention
for vector inequalities that x > x ′ if xk > x ′k for all commodities k = 1, . . . , `; x > x
′ if x > x ′ and
x , x ′; and x  x ′ if xk > x ′k for all commodities k = 1, . . . , `.
Every agent is a consumer-producer, endowed with consumptive as well as productive abilities,
represented by a pair (u,P), where u : R`+ → R is a utility function representing the agent’s
consumptive preferences and P ⊂ R` is her production set consisting of production plans of outputs
and inputs that the consumer-producer can execute.3
3roughout, we use the notational convention that for two sets S and T , S ⊂ T stands for weak inclusion, i.e., S is
either a strict subset of T or S = T .
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2.1 Properties of production sets
For every consumer-producer (u,P), a production plan y ∈ P can be wrien as y = y+ − y− where
y+ = y ∨ 0 ∈ R`+ denotes the vector of outputs in this production plan and y− = (−y) ∨ 0 ∈ R`+
denotes the vector of marketable inputs required for producing outputs y+.
We distinguish two types of inputs: Marketable inputs, which are part of the ` commodities
introduced above, and non-marketable inputs, which are assumed to be outside the realm of the
commodity space. e approach to the modelling of production introduced here is, therefore, similar
to the one detailed in Sondermann (1974, Section 2.1).4 We allow the possibility that all outputs
are generated using non-marketable inputs only, i.e., y+ > 0 and y− = 0. e laer case is the one
explored mainly in the literature on economies with consumer-producers (Yang, 2001; Sun, Yang,
and Zhou, 2004; Diamantaras and Gilles, 2004).
Denition 2.1 Consider a production set P ⊂ R` . en we introduce the following terminology:
(i) e production set P is regular if P is a closed set such that 0 ∈ P; it is comprehensive: 5
P − R`+ =
{
y − z y ∈ P and z ∈ R`+ } ⊂ P ; (1)
and it is bounded from above, i.e., there exists some Q ∈ R` such that y 6 Q for all y ∈ P.
(ii) e production set P is delimited if there exists a non-empty compact subset P of P such
that 0 ∈ P and P = P − R`+.
(iii) e production set P is home-based if there exists a non-empty compact subset P of P such
that P ⊂ R`+ and P = P − R`+.
A regular production set satises some properties accepted in general equilibrium models with
production, namely the ability to cease production altogether and the assumption of free disposal
in production. Note that regularity does not impose convexity, allowing production to exhibit
non-convexities. Additionally, we require production to be bounded, which is a natural hypothesis
due to the assumed size of a consumer-producer.
A delimited production set is based on a compact set of relevant production plans, subject to
free disposal. Obviously, delimited production sets are regular. e dierence between regular and
delimited production sets is illustrated in Figure 1.
Home-based production is a special case of delimited production, reecting the assumption that
production is essentially based on the use of non-marketable inputs only. e relevant production
plans now represent only output vectors that can be generated using non-marketable inputs and
are collected in a compact set P ⊂ R`+ with 0 ∈ P to which one applies free-disposal. We explicitly
assume that under home production a consumer-producer can generate (marketable) commodities
in positive quantities using non-marketable inputs only.
4Sondermann frames his discussion in the context of coalition production economies, i.e., productive abilities are assigned
to coalitions of economic agents. For further discussions of coalition production economies we refer to Hildenbrand
(1974); Sondermann (1974); Oddou (1982) and Basile (1993).
5For two sets S and T , we let S −T = {x − y | x ∈ S and y ∈ T }.
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Figure 1: Comparing regular and delimited production sets.
Figure 2 illustrates home-based production. In the le panel the production set is founded on
exactly 4 home production plans, using non-marketable inputs to produce positive quantities of two
marketable commodities X and Y . In the right panel the home-based production set is based on a
compact curve in R2+ denoted by P. In both cases the production set is constructed by applying the
free-disposal property to all home production plans represented in P.
x
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0
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P
x
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0
Figure 2: Illustrations of home-based production sets.
Some regularity assumptions. roughout this paper we impose standard regularity conditions
on the preferences as well as the productive abilities in this economy.
Axiom 2.2 For every consumer-producer represented by the pair (u,P) we assume the following
properties:
(i) e utility function u : R`+ → R is continuous on the consumption space R`+ and
(ii) e production set P ⊂ R` is regular.
Additional assumptions are used in various theorems that we derive throughout this paper. In
particular, we may impose that preferences satisfy certain standard monotonicity properties: A
6
utility function u : R`+ → R satises local non-satiation if for every bundle x1 ∈ R`+ and every ε > 0
there exists some bundle x2 ∈ R`+ such that ‖x1 − x2‖ < ε and u(x2) > u(x1); a utility function is
non-decreasing if u(x2) > u(x1) for all x2 > x1; a utility function u is monotone if u(x2) > u(x1) for
all x2  x1; and a utility function u is strictly monotone if u(x2) > u(x1) for all x2 > x1.
Production functions. Yang (2001); Yao (2002); Cheng and Yang (2004) and Diamantaras and
Gilles (2004) assume that production sets are generated by production functions. e formulation of
a consumer-producer as a pair (u,P) satisfying Axiom 2.2 also captures the case that production is
based on the allocation of one unit of non-marketable labour time over ` dierent (home) production
processes, each generating the output of a marketable commodity.6
Example 2.3 For every commodity k ∈ {1, . . . , `}, let φk : [0, 1] → R+ be a production function
converting a certain fraction of one unit of invested labour time in the output of the k-th commodity.
We impose that φk is continuous and non-decreasing, that φk (Lk ) > 0 for all Lk > 0, and that
φk (0) = 0. Now let ϕ(L) = (φ1(L1), . . . ,φ`(L`) ) for any labour time vector L ∈ [0, 1]` such that∑
k Lk = 1. Now dene
P(ϕ) = P(ϕ) − R`+ ⊂ R` (2)
where
P(ϕ) =
{
ϕ(L1, . . . ,L`)
 ∑`
k=1
Lk = 1
}
⊂ R`+. (3)
Now, P(ϕ) is a home-based production set. Indeed, 0 ∈ P(ϕ) and P(ϕ) is bounded from above
by (φ1(1), . . . ,φ`(1) )  0 as well as comprehensive. Also, due to the scalability of labour time,
ϕ
( 1
` , . . . ,
1
`
) ∈ P(ϕ) ∩R`++, which implies that the agent can produce all marketable commodities in
positive quantities. 
2.2 e consumer-producer’s problem
A consumer-producer represented by (u,P) participates in a system of perfectly competitive markets
and faces a price vector p ∈ R`+. Consequently, she optimises her utility over the set of feasible
consumption-production plans with the goal to maximise consumptive satisfaction. is optimisation
problem is denoted as the “consumer-producer problem”:
Axiom 2.4 For any p > 0, a consumer-producer (u,P) aims to select a consumption plan xˆ ∈ R`+ and
production plan yˆ ∈ P such that (xˆ , yˆ) solves
max
{
u(x) x ∈ R`+ , y ∈ P and p · x 6 p · y } . (4)
6We emphasise that the referred framework is based on the investment of labour time in the production of the various
commodities. e main dierence between the construction developed in Example 2.3 below and the model referred to
from the literature is that we assume that labour time cannot be converted to leisure time and leisure time is not featured
explicitly as an input in the utility function.
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In this statement, xˆ ∈ R`+ is agent a’s optimal consumption bundle, while yˆ is an optimal production
plan to support that consumption bundle. Now, t = yˆ − xˆ ∈ R` is the vector of net trades submied
to the market. e next lemma is straightforward and, therefore, a proof is omied.
Lemma 2.5 If (u,P) satises Axiom 2.2, the consumer-producer problem (4) admits a solution for
every strictly positive price vector p  0.
e dichotomy of consumption and production. e consumer-producer problem can be
transformed into a two-stage maximisation problem that separates the production decision from the
consumption decision. In the rst stage, a production plan is selected that maximises the income
generated for the given market prices. In the second stage, this maximal income is used to acquire a
utility maximising nal consumption bundle. is establishes a dichotomy of the production and
consumption decisions under a price mechanism at the level of the individual economic agent.7
eorem 2.6 – Dichotomy of consumption and production
Let (u,P) represent a consumer-producer. Under the regularity properties stated in Axiom 2.2 and the
additional assumption that u is monotone, for every positive price vector p > 0, the consumer-producer
problem (4) is equivalent to the following two-stage problem:
Income maximisation: e consumer-producer rst solves
max {p · y | y ∈ P} (5)
Denote the solution of (5) by
Ω(p) = argmax {p · y | y ∈ P} ⊂ P (6)
and
I (p) = max {p · y | y ∈ P} = p · Ω(p). (7)
Standard demand problem: e consumer-producer subsequently solves a standard demand prob-
lem formulated as
max {u(x) | p · x 6 I (p)} (8)
For a proof of this assertion we refer to Appendix A.
Wen (1998b, Proposition 1) shows that the dichotomy of consumption and production cannot be
extended to situations with transaction costs as set out in Yang (2001).
7We emphasise that this “weak” dichotomy is dierent from a “social” dichotomy that is imposed through the social
organisation of production in general equilibrium models of Walrasian economies with production.
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2.3 Increasing Returns to Specialisation
Our aim is to formally express the principle that production is subject to Increasing Returns to
Specialisation, representing the human ability to learn to produce outputs more eectively when
specialising in certain tasks (Smith, 1776, Chapter 1). In our framework such specialisation is
captured by the notion of a “full specialisation” production plan, in which an agent produces only
one output and uses any other commodity as an input only. Our formalisation of Increasing Returns
to Specialisation states that a complete set of full specialisation production plans form the corner
points of the production set available to the consumer-producer.
Denition 2.7 Consider a regular production set P ⊂ R` .
Full specialisation: A production plan zk ∈ P is a full specialisation production plan for
commodity k ∈ {1, . . . , `} if there exists some positive output quantity Qk > 0 and some input
vector yk ∈ R`+ such that ykk = 0, zk+ = Qkek and zk− = yk .
WIRSpec: e production set P exhibitsWeakly Increasing Returns to Specialisation if for every
commodity k ∈ {1, . . . , `} there exists some full specialisation production plan zk ∈ P such that
P ⊂ Conv {z1, . . . , z`} − R`+ (9)
where Conv S = {λx + (1−λ)y | x ,y ∈ S and 0 6 λ 6 1} denotes the convex hull of a set S ⊂ R` .
SIRSpec: e regular production set P exhibits Strongly Increasing Returns to Specialisation
if P exhibits WIRSpec for a corresponding set of full specialisation production plans Q ={
z1, . . . , z`
}
introduced above such that P ∩ (ConvQ) = Q.
e denition above formalises the idea that specialising in the production of a single commodity
results in the maximal output of that particular commodity. In this formalisation we assume that
the consumer-producer is able to fully specialise in any of the ` marketable commodities under
consideration. is is a strong assumption, requiring that the consumer-producer has specialised
productive abilities in all marketable commodities.
From Denition 2.7, WIRSpec implies that all full specialisation production plans in Q ={
z1, . . . , z`
}
are necessarily on the boundary of the production set P : zk = Qkek − yk ∈ ∂P for
every k ∈ {1, . . . , `}. As such, the property that Q ⊂ P ⊂ ConvQ − R`+ implies that the full
specialisation production plans in Q are exactly those production plans in which all inputs are used
optimally. ese are natural candidates for solutions to the income maximisation problem.
Illustration of WIRSpec. A production set satisfying WIRSpec is illustrated in Figure 3. It
considers a delimited production set P based on a nite set of 5 production plans P as depicted.
e two most extreme production plans z1 and z2 in P form a set Q = {z1, z2} and span ConvQ. As
such, in the two production plans z1 and z2 the production of a single output is most ecient: In z2,
the output of commodity X is maximised, while in z1 the output of commodity Y is maximised.
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xy
0
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Figure 3: Illustration of a production set satisfying WIRSpec.
Illustration of SIRSpec. SIRSpec imposes that there is a strict productivity increase from spe-
cialising in the production of a single output in the sense that maximal income levels can only be
aained through full specialisation in the production of that particular commodity. is is illustrated
in Figure 4, which is a modication of the illustration in Figure 3.
x
y
0
ConvQ
z2
z1
Figure 4: Illustration of a production set satisfying SIRSpec.
Some properties of IRSpec production sets. e next proposition collects some properties of
production sets satisfying WIRSpec and SIRSpec. In particular, SIRSpec implies that strictly positive
collective output levels of all commodities can be achieved by mixing well-chosen full specialisation
production plans. A proof is presented in Appendix B.
Proposition 2.8
(a) If a production set P satises WIRSpec, then it is delimited.
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(b) If a production set P is home-based, then P satises WIRSpec if and only if there exist
output quantities Qk > 0 for all k ∈ {1, . . . , `} with Q ⊂ P ⊂ ConvQ − R`+ where
Q = {Q1e1, . . . ,Q`e`}.
(c) If a production set P ⊂ R` satises SIRSpec, then ConvP ∩ R`++ , .
Next we extend the dichotomy of production and consumption (eorem 2.6). We show that IRSpec
implies that—as expected—the consumer-producer’s income is maximised in a full-specialisation
production plan. is theorem compares to similar specialisation results stated in Wen (1998a,b),
Yao (2002, eorem 2) and Diamantaras and Gilles (2004, eorem 5).8
eorem 2.9 – Specialisationeorem
(a) If P satises WIRSpec, then for any solution of the consumer-producer problem (4) for p > 0,
there exists a solution in which the consumer-producer produces no more than one commodity
and obtains at least as much utility.
(b) If P satises SIRSpec, then every solution of the consumer-producer problem (4) for p > 0 is
such that the consumer-producer produces no more than one commodity.
A proof of eorem 2.9 is provided in Appendix C of this paper.
e notion of Increasing Returns to Specialisation (IRSpec) as formulated here generalises the
well-known notion of convexity of production functions (Example 2.3), which in turn implies that
the generated production set satises Increasing Returns to Scale (IRS). For a proof of the following
assertions we refer to Appendix D.
Proposition 2.10 Consider the model of production developed in Example 2.3.
(a) If all production functions φk (k = 1, . . . , `) are convex, then P(ϕ) satises WIRSpec.
(b) If all production functions φk (k = 1, . . . , `) are convex and for at least one k ′ the production
function φk ′ is strictly convex, then P(ϕ) satises SIRSpec.
3 Market economies and competitive equilibria
We consider a model of an economy in which all agents are consumer-producers and simultaneously
make decisions regarding consumption and production under a given vector of competitive market
prices. Our denition subsumes the continuity and regularity properties stated in Axiom 2.2.
Denition 3.1 An economy with ` commodities is a triple E = 〈 (A, Σ, µ),u,P〉 where
(i) (A, Σ, µ) is a complete probability space of consumer-producers such that every a ∈ A is
represented by a pair (ua ,Pa);
8e main dierence between the framework developed in the current paper and the referred contributions is that
these papers consider as well the eects of transactions costs on the production and consumption decisions of consumer-
producers. e introduction of transaction costs reduces the clarity of the analysis of specialisation decisions in the
consumer-producer problem.
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(ii) e function u : A × R`+ → R assigns a continuous utility function ua to every a ∈ A such that
for every consumption bundle x ∈ R`+ the function u(·,x) : A→ R is measurable on (A, Σ);
(iii) e correspondence P : A → 2R` assigns a regular production set Pa ⊂ R` to every agent
a ∈ A and has a measurable graph in Σ ⊗ B (R` ) , and;
(iv) ere exists an integrable upper bound Q : A→ R` such that for almost every a ∈ A : y 6 Q(a)
for every production plan y ∈ Pa .
An economy E = 〈 (A, Σ, µ),u,P〉 is a continuum economy if the complete probability space of
consumer-producers (A, Σ, µ) is atomless.
We emphasise that this denition of an economy imposes that preferences are assumed to be
continuous and production sets to be regular. Furthermore, we incorporate standard measurability
properties of preferences and the production correspondence. Finally, productive abilities are
bounded from above by an integrable upper bound.
An allocation in the economy E = 〈 (A, Σ, µ),u,P〉 is a pair (f ,д) where f : A→ R`+ is an integrable
assignment of consumption bundles and д : A → R` is an integrable selection of the production
correspondence P. us, an allocation (f ,д) consists of an assignment of consumption bundles f
and an assignment of production plans д.
An allocation (f ,д) is feasible if all allocated consumption bundles are covered exactly by the
produced quantities of all commodities, i.e.,∫
f dµ =
∫
дdµ . (10)
An equilibrium can now be introduced as a feasible allocation that is supported by a price vector for
which almost all consumer-producers select optimal consumption and production plans.
Denition 3.2 Consider an economy E = 〈 (A, Σ, µ),u,P〉.
An allocation (f ,д) is a competitive equilibrium in E if (f ,д) is feasible and there exists some positive
price vector p > 0 such that for almost every agent a ∈ A, (f (a),д(a)) solve a’s consumer-producer
problem (4) for p (Axiom 2.4).
3.1 Pareto optimality and the Welfare eorems
Traditionally, the so-called “Fundamental eorems of Welfare Economics” investigate the relation-
ship between social or Pareto optimality and market equilibrium.
Formally, an allocation (f ,д) in an economy E is Pareto optimal if (f ,д) is feasible and there is
no alternative feasible allocation (f ′,д′) such that ua(f ′(a)) > ua(f (a)) for almost all agents a ∈ A
and there exists some non-negligible coalition S ∈ Σ with µ(S) > 0 such that ua(f ′(a)) > ua(f (a))
for all a ∈ S . We show that every competitive equilibrium is Pareto optimal in our framework.
eorem 3.3 – First Welfare eorem
Let E = 〈 (A, Σ, µ),u,P〉 be an economy. If almost every agent a ∈ A has a monotone utility function
ua , then every competitive equilibrium in E is Pareto optimal.
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A proof of this theorem is relegated to Appendix E.
e Second Welfare eorem asserts that every Pareto optimal allocation can be supported as an
equilibrium through an appropriate re-allocation of initial resources. In the extension of the Second
Welfare eorem to our seing, we use the notion of a tax-subsidy scheme or lump-sum wealth
transfer system τ : A→ R to re-allocate wealth among agents. Here, for a ∈ A, τ (a) > 0 represents a
tax, while τ (a) < 0 denotes a subsidy.
eorem 3.4 – Second Welfare eorem
Let E = 〈 (A, Σ, µ),u,P〉 be a continuum economy and let (f ,д) be a Pareto optimal allocation in E.
(a) If almost every agent a ∈ A has a utility function ua that satises local non-satiation, then there
exists an integrable transfer system τ : A→ R with ∫ τ dµ = 0 and a price vector p > 0 such
that for almost every a ∈ A :
τ (a) 6 sup p · Pa and p · f (a) + τ (a) = p · д(a) = sup p · Pa (11)
as well as
ua(x) > ua(f (a)) implies that p · x + τ (a) > sup p · Pa . (12)
(b) If almost every agent a ∈ A has a strictly monotone utility function ua and a production set Pa
satisfying SIRSpec, then there exists an integrable transfer system τ : A→ R with ∫ τ dµ = 0
and a strictly positive price vector p  0 such that for almost every a ∈ A :
τ (a) 6 max p · Pa and p · f (a) + τ (a) = p · д(a) = max p · Pa (13)
as well as
ua(x) > ua(f (a)) implies that p · x + τ (a) > p · д(a). (14)
For a proof of eorem 3.4 we refer to Appendix F.
3.2 Existence of competitive equilibria
e existence of competitive equilibria in our framework compares to the existence of equilibria in
coalition-production economies. Hildenbrand (1974, Chapter 4) established the existence of quasi-
equilibria, which was subsequently strengthened to the existence of full equilibria by Suzuki (1995),
De Simone (1997) and Toda (2002) under various hypotheses. We show that in our seing competitive
equilibria can quite straightforwardly be shown to exist if the economy satises Strongly Increasing
Returns to Specialisation (SIRSpec), avoiding the additional restricting hypotheses introduced by
these authors. As expected, the introduction of Increasing Returns to Specialisation makes existence
dicult to establish in countably innite and nite economies.
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Example 3.5 – Non-existence of competitive equilibria in a countable economy.9
We consider an economy with two commodities X and Y and a countable number of economic
agents, who are identical in consumptive and productive capabilities, but who are heterogenous
through their relative size.
In particular, consider an agent population A = N with Σ = 2N and µ(S) = ∑a∈S λa where λ1 = 23
and λa = 13·2a−1 for all a ∈ N \ {1}. Obviously, µ(A) = 1 since λ is a convergent series.
Furthermore, for every a ∈ A : Pa = {(1, 0), (0, 1)} and ua(x ,y) = xy.
Claim: is economy does not admit a competitive equilibrium.
Indeed, since both commodities are necessities for all economic agents, both need to be produced
in positive quantities. From the income maximisation problem stated in eorem 2.6, this is only
possible if px = py = p > 0 and the generated income is Ia = p for all a ∈ A. is implies for all a ∈ A
the optimal consumption bundle is given by f (a) = ( 12 , 12 ) . us, market demand is ∫ f dµ = ( 12 , 12 ) ,
which cannot be matched by market supply due to the fact that the production choice of agent 1
would generate an excess supply of that particular commodity. Hence, there is no equilibrium in
this economy. 
Under Strongly Increasing Returns to Specialisation (SIRSpec), the existence of a non-trivial compet-
itive equilibrium can be established in a continuum economy. A proof of this theorem is provided in
Appendix G of this paper.
eorem 3.6 – Existence eorem
Suppose that E = 〈 (A, Σ, µ),u,P〉 is a continuum economy such that almost every agent a ∈ A has a
strictly monotone utility function ua and a production set Pa that satises SIRSpec. en there exists a
competitive equilibrium in E with f (a) > 0 for almost all agents a ∈ A.
We remark that the assumptions on the production sets in the assertion of eorem 3.6 combine
delimited production sets with an integrable upper bound, introduced as Denition 3.1(iv). is
delimited integrable boundedness condition is weaker than the uniform boundedness condition (2d)
in De Simone (1997, page 254) as well as the boundedness hypothesis imposed as Assumption 2 in
Sun, Yang, and Zhou (2004, page 241) to guarantee existence of competitive equilibria in similarly
formulated economies with agent-based production. erefore, our existence theorem does not
follow directly from the results stated in these contributions.10
e assertion of eorem 3.6 that there exists an equilibrium with non-trivial consumption no
longer holds if we weaken the requirement on the production sets to WIRSpec instead of SIRSpec.
Indeed, the next example shows that under WIRSpec competitive equilibria might exist in which no
meaningful consumption is achieved, even though all consumer-producers are engaged in productive
activities and there is trade of all commodities in the economy.
9I thank a referee of this journal for pointing out this simple counterexample.
10Furthermore, we note that Sun, Yang, and Zhou (2004) impose a dierent structure of the productive abilities of the
consumer-producers, which is founded on home-based production through the single input of labour only similar to the
structure introduced in Example 2.3.
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Example 3.7 Consider an economy with two commodities X and Y and a continuum (A, Σ, µ) of
consumer-producers. Let all consumer-producers have identical production sets given by P =
{ (1,−1) , (0, 0) , (−1, 1) }−R2+. is production set reects that each consumer-producer can convert
one commodity into the other, or be productively inactive. Clearly, the production set P satises
WIRSpec, but not SIRSpec, as illustrated in Figure 5.
x
y
−1 0 1
−1
1
P
Figure 5: e production set in Example 3.7.
Now, there exists a continuum of competitive equilibria in which there is no consumption. Let
SX ∈ Σ be a coalition of agents producing (1,−1); SY ∈ Σ be a coalition of agents producing (−1, 1);
and S0 ∈ Σ be a coalition of inactive agents, generating (0, 0). Now, for any 0 6 λ 6 12 , a coalition
structure (SX , SY , S0) satisfying µ(SX ) = µ(SY ) = λ and µ(S0) = 1 − 2λ denes a social division of
labour that generates a collective output of (0, 0). Together with an allocation f with f (a) = (0, 0)
for a ∈ A, this establishes a competitive equilibrium at equilibrium prices px = py .
However, none of these equilibria generates any meaningful consumption of either commodity in
this economy. In particular, for λ = 12 , almost all agents engage in productive activities, but there is
actually no consumption in this economy. 
A straightforward modication of the proof of eorem 3.6 gives conditions for existence of compet-
itive equilibria in a continuum economy with home-based production only.
Corollary 3.8 Suppose that E = 〈 (A, Σ, µ),u,P〉 is a continuum economy such that almost every
agent a ∈ A has a strictly monotone utility function ua and a home-based production set Pa .
en there exists a competitive equilibrium in E with f (a) > 0 for almost all agents a ∈ A.
e proof of this corollary rests on the recognition that the zero-vector acts essentially as a strict
lower bound for all meaningful home-based production. is guarantees that all agents generate a
positive income under positive prices, implying the boundary property of the economy’s excess
demand function. Under home production SIRSpec is no longer necessary to guarantee the existence
of a non-trivial equilibrium.
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4 Equilibration through the social division of labour
Adam Smith’s “Invisible Hand” metaphor extends in our model to the assignment of consumer-
producers to appropriate roles in the prevailing social division of labour. ere indeed emerges a strict
social division of labour founded on full specialisation in production if there are Increasing Returns
to Specialisation in production. is insight is formalised through the dichotomy of consumption and
production under the competitive price mechanism stated ineorem 2.6 as well as the Specialisation
eorem 2.9.
e consequences of this for the equilibration of the economy are further investigated here. In
particular, we identify conditions under which the economy equilibrates through the adjustment
of the social division of labour rather than through the price mechanism. In that case, rather than
supply and demand determining the equilibrium price of a commodity, the supply side conditions
completely determine the terms of trade, while demand is satised by the appropriate adjustment of
the social division of labour.
is phenomenon occurs in economies in which consumer-producers have similar productive
abilities when fully specialised in the production of a single output. e next example illustrates
this.
Example 4.1 Consider a continuum economy E with two commodities X and Y and a popu-
lation A = [0, 1] endowed with the standard Lebesgue measure λ. Suppose that all consumer-
producers are endowed with a home-based WIRSpec production set such that {(4, 0), (0, 4)} ⊂ Pa ⊂
Conv {(4, 0), (0, 4)} − R2+ for all a ∈ A. Hence, all consumer-producers have a similar ability to
produce either commodity when fully specialised and these full-specialisation production plans
maximise the generated income.
We denote the market price of commodity Y by py > 0, which is stated in terms of commodity X ,
i.e., px = 1.
Furthermore, we assume that the agents’ preferences—through the standard demand problem—result
in some standard (continuous and integrable) demand function d : A × R+ × R+ → R2++ such that
d(a, I ,py )  0 for all I > 0 and py > 0, and almost all a ∈ A.
Now, let I (a,py ) denote the maximal income at price py > 0. Obviously, it is optimal to specialise in
X if py 6 1 and in Y if py > 1. Hence, I (a,py ) = 4 for py 6 1 and I (a,py ) = 4py for py > 1.
We can now easily establish that in a competitive equilibrium, in order to meet the strictly positive
market demand
∫
d(·, I (·,py ),py )dλ  0, the equilibrium price is unique and given by p∗y = 1, which
coincides with the ratio of the output levels under full specialisation. is results in a generated
income under complete specialisation of I ∗ = I (a,p∗y ) = 4 for almost all a ∈ A.
Now, at equilibrium price p∗y = 1 we have
∫
d(a, I ∗,p∗y )dλ(a) = (x∗,y∗)  (0, 0) with x∗ + y∗ = 4
and, therefore, this equilibrium is achieved through the adjustment of the social division of labour
with a population fraction ν = x ∗4 specialising in the production of X and the remaining population
fraction 1 − ν = y∗4 specialising in the production of Y . 
Uniform specialisation and specialisation types. It is clear that in Example 4.1 equilibration
is accomplished through adjustment of the social division of labour rather than through standard
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price equilibration. Here, we discuss the conditions under which this occurs. e next denition
introduces the required notions to properly describe these situations.
Denition 4.2 Let E = 〈 (A, Σ, µ),u,P〉 be an economy such that almost all agents are endowed with
a production set that satises WIRSpec. Denote by Qa ⊂ R` a set of ` full-specialisation production
plans for agent a ∈ A with Qa ⊂ Pa ⊂ ConvQa − R`+, as introduced in Denition 2.7. en:
(i) Two agents a,b ∈ A, a , b, are specialised equivalently if both a and b are endowed with
production sets such that their full specialisation production plans coincide: Qa = Qb .
(ii) e economy E is a specialisation type economy withT > 2 specialisation types if the agent
population A is partitioned in a nite number of measurable subsets {A1, . . . ,AT } such that
µ(At ) > 0 and almost all agents in At are specialised equivalently, t = 1, . . . ,T , i.e., for all
types t = 1, . . . ,T and all commodities k = 1, . . . , `, there exist full specialisation production
plans zkt = Q
k
t ek − zk−t ∈ R` with for almost every a ∈ At :
Qt ⊂ Pa ⊂ ConvQt − R`+, (15)
where Qt =
{
zkt , . . . , z
`
t
}
is the set of ` full specialisation production plans for Type t agents.
(iii) e economy E satises the uniform specialisation property if almost all agents in the
population A are specialised equivalently, i.e., for every commodity k ∈ {1, . . . , `} there exists
a full specialisation production plan zk = Qkek − zk− ∈ R` with for almost every a ∈ A :
Q ⊂ Pa ⊂ ConvQ − R`+, (16)
where Q = { z1, . . . , z` }.
Two agents that are specialised equivalently will be able to execute exactly the same production
plan when they are fully specialised in the production of a single commodity. Hence, under full
specialisation both agents produce the specied commodity to exactly the same standards.
A specialisation type economy is one in which there are a nite number of standards of speciali-
sation. Here each type represents the agents that produce an output to a common standard. ese
types, therefore, can be interpreted as dierent communities in the population, which adhere to
dierent production standards.
An economy that satises the uniform specialisation property is one in which full specialisation
is subject to imposed external standards rather than individual abilities. us, under the uniform
specialisation property, the economy has a single production standard. is extends the Smithian
logic of uniform specialisation standards in production in comparison with the Ricardian logic that
specialisation is based on purely individualistic standards (Buchanan and Yoon, 2002).
e next result species the consequences of uniform specialisation standards for the resulting
competitive equilibria. In particular, we show that the endogenous adjustment of the social division
of labour in such economies completely determine the competitive prices of all commodities. As a
consequence, the production technologies induce all equilibrium prices in this economy.
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eorem 4.3 Let E = 〈 (A, Σ, µ),u,P〉 be an economy that satises the properties imposed in Deni-
tion 3.1 as well as the following properties:
• Every agent a ∈ A is endowed with a monotone utility function ua as well as a production set Pa
that satises WIRSpec;
• E satises the uniform specialisation property based on a set of ` common full specialisation
production plans Q = { z1, . . . , z` }, and;
• E admits a competitive equilibrium (f ∗,д∗) such that ∫ f ∗ dµ = ∫ д∗ dµ  0.
en the competitive equilibrium (f ∗,д∗) is supported by a price vector p∗ > 0 such that for all
k,m ∈ {1, . . . , `} with k ,m : p∗ · zk = p∗ · zm .
For a proof of eorem 4.3 we refer to Appendix H of this paper.
eorem 4.3 identies the conditions under which the characteristics of the productive abilities that
are present in the economy determine the equilibrium prices of all commodities in the economy. In
particular, under WIRSpec, if economic agents produce the same output levels of the commodities
that they are specialised in, the competitive equilibrium prices will fully reect this socially aainable
productivity level.
One of the immediate consequences ofeorem 4.3 and its proof is that all agents in this economy
have exactly the same income level in equilibrium. is implies that the generated allocation of
consumption bundles exhibits no envy as pointed out by Varian (1974).
Corollary 4.4 Let E = 〈 (A, Σ, µ),u,P〉 be a continuum economy satisfying the properties assumed
in eorem 4.3. Let (f ∗,д∗) be a competitive equilibrium with ∫ f ∗ dµ = ∫ д∗ dµ  0.
en the equilibrium allocation f ∗ of nal consumption bundles is fair in the sense of Varian (1974), i.e.,
f ∗ is envy-free as well as Pareto optimal.
e next example shows that if the assumption of WIRSpec is weakened and a specialised consumer-
producer can generate multiple outputs, the main assertion of eorem 4.3 is no longer valid.
Example 4.5 Consider a continuum economy with A = [0, 1] endowed with the Lebesgue measure
λ and three commodities X , Y and Z . All consumer-producers are identical and characterised by
the Cobb-Douglas utility function u(x ,y, z) = xyzα , where α > 0, and the home-based production
set P = {z1, z2, z3} − R3+ with z1 = (1, 0, 1), z2 = (0, 1, 1) and z3 = (0, 0, 2). We emphasise that P
does not satisfy WIRSpec, since Good 3 is produced in all production plans in P. Hence, Good 3 is a
by-product in every production process described in P.
In this economy two types of equilibria emerge, depending on the demand for Z expressed through
the value of α :
High demand for Z with α > 2: In this case there emerges an equilibrium that is determined
fully by supply side conditions as stated in eorem 4.3. Equilibrium prices are determined
as px = py = pz = 1 generating an income of I = 2 for consumer-producers regardless
their specialisation. Now, the fractions of consumer-producers specialising in the three full
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specialisation production plans can be determined as µ1 = µ2 = 2α+2 and µ3 =
α−2
α+2 . e
consumption in equilibrium is determined as
( 2
α+2 ,
2
α+2 ,
2α
α+2
)
.
Low demand for Z with α < 2: In this case there emerges an equilibrium in which consumer-
producers only specialise in the two rst production plans and the equilibrium prices are
determined through interaction of the demand and supply sides, antithetical to the assertion of
eorem 4.3. Indeed, one can compute that in equilibrium px = py = 1 and pz = 12α < 1. e
generated equilibrium income now is I1 = I2 = 12α + 1 > I3 = α . So, agents only specialise in
one of the rst two production plans. In equilibrium, the social division of labour is µ1 = µ2 = 12
and µ3 = 0. e resulting consumption in equilibrium is
( 1
2 ,
1
2 , 1
)
.
Here, the production set does not satisfy WIRSpec due to the ability of consumer-producers to
generate two outputs. is causes the exclusion of the third specialisation in equilibrium under low
demand for commodity Z . 
Non-traded commodities. We consider an example of an economy exhibiting SIRSpec that
illustrates the consequences of some commodity not being traded in equilibrium, a case excluded in
eorems 4.3 and 4.8. Here, the resulting equilibrium allocation and social division of labour can be
supported by multiple price vectors.
Example 4.6 Consider an economy with a continuum of economic agents (A, Σ, µ) and two com-
modities, X and Y . All agents are endowed with the same Stone-Geary utility function and the same
production set given by
U (x ,y) = (x + 1)(y + 1) and P = {(1,−q), (−1,Q), (0, 0)} − R2+,
where Q > q > 0 and q 6 1 are, respectively, the output of good Y under full specialisation and the
input of good Y in the production of good X under full specialisation. Clearly, the given production
set satises SIRSpec.
e equilibrium prices identied in eorem 4.3 are computed as p∗x = 1 and p∗y = 2Q+q . e
generated equilibrium income level of each agent is determined as I ∗ = Q−qQ+q > 0.
If 0 6 q < 1 < Q , demand for both goods is given by
d(p∗) =
(
1 − q
Q + q
,
Q − 1
2
)
while, if 0 6 q < Q 6 1, demand is given by
d(p∗) =
(
Q − q
Q + q
, 0
)
.
Hence, there would no trade, consumption and production of good Y for the inecient production
technologies of Y described by the second case, in particular Q 6 1.
Furthermore, for 0 6 q < Q 6 1 there are multiple price vectors that support the same equilibrium
allocation. For example, if q = 0 and Q = 12 the nal consumption bundle of each agent is given by
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f = (1, 0) and this is supported by all equilibrium price vectors p∗ = (1,p∗y ) with 2 6 p∗y 6 4. Of
these equilibrium price vectors, only p∗ = (1, 4) satises the properties stated in eorem 4.3. 
Economies with home production. e previous analysis can be stated for economies with
home-based production only. In this case, the equilibrium prices are straightforwardly determined by
achievable output levels in full specialisation only. e next corollary is an immediate consequence
of Proposition 2.8(b) and eorem 4.3.
Corollary 4.7 Let E = 〈 (A, Σ, µ),u,P〉 be an economy with home-based production satisfying the
properties stated ineorem 4.3. If E satises the uniform specialisation property withQ ⊂ Pa ⊂ Q−R`+
for almost all a ∈ A, where Q = {Q1e1, . . . ,Q`e`} withQk > 0 for k = 1, . . . , `, then every competitive
equilibrium (f ∗,д∗) with ∫ f ∗ dµ = ∫ д∗ dµ  0 can be supported by the price vector p∗  0 given by
p∗k =
1
Qk
for all k ∈ {1, . . . , `}. (17)
e conclusions of eorem 4.3 can also be extended to specialisation type economies with home-
based production.
eorem 4.8 Let E = 〈 (A, Σ, µ),u,P〉 be an economy in which every agent a ∈ A has a monotone
utility functionua and a home-based production set Pa that satises WIRspec for a set of full home-based
production plans Qa = {Q1ae1, . . . ,Q`ae`} with Qka > 0 for k = 1, . . . , `.
If E is a specialisation type economy with T 6 ` − 1 types, then every competitive equilibrium (f ∗,д∗)
with
∫
f ∗ dµ =
∫
д∗ dµ  0 can be supported by an equilibrium price vector p∗ > 0 such that there
exists at least one type tˆ ∈ {1, . . . ,T } and at least two commodities k,m ∈ {1, . . . , `} with k ,m and
p∗k Q
k
t = p
∗
m Q
m
t .
For a proof of eorem 4.8 we refer to Appendix I of this paper.
e requirement in eorem 4.8 that the number of specialisation types in the economy are bounded
by the number of commodities traded is binding. e next example shows that prices are determined
fully by demand and supply—rather than the adaptation of the endogenous social division of labour—
if the number of types equals the dimension of the commodity space.
Example 4.9 Consider a continuum economyEwithA = [0, 1] endowedwith the Lebesguemeasure
λ and ` > 2 commodities. Suppose that all agents a ∈ A are endowed with Cobb-Douglas preferences
represented as
u(x) =
∑`
k=1
αk logxk with αk > 0 for all k ∈ {1, . . . , `} and
∑`
k=1
αk = 1. (18)
Let there be ` specialisation types {At | t = 1, . . . , `} with λ(At ) = 1` for t = 1, . . . , `. All Type t
agents a ∈ At are endowed with identical production sets given by
Pt = Conv {e1, . . . , et−1,Qet , et+1, . . . , e` } − R`+
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where
Q >
maxk αk
mink αk
> 1. (19)
e laer condition imposes that specialisation of Type t agents results in a large enough output
level in this economy to satisfy all demands. In other words, none of the commodities are too scarce.
Claim: In this economy, there exists a competitive equilibrium with an equilibrium price vector given
by p∗k = αk , k = 1, . . . , `.
To show the claim, for the given price vector p∗k = αk , k = 1, . . . , `, it is clear that the optimal
decision for an agent of type t is to produce only commodity t , i.e., д∗(a) = Qet for almost all a ∈ At .
By (19), the generated income for type t agents is It (p∗) = αtQ > αk for all k , t .
Now for almost all a ∈ At , the equilibrium demand at p∗ is given by dt (p∗) = αtQe where e =
(1, . . . , 1). Hence, total demand from type t agents is given by∫
At
d(p∗)dλ = αt
`
Qe
and total market demand is computed as∫
d(p∗)dλ =
∑`
t=1
∫
At
d(p∗)dλ =
∑`
t=1
αt
`
Qe = Q` e .
Furthermore, total market supply of commodity k is now computed as λ(Ak )Q = Q` and, therefore,
total market supply exactly covers total market demand at the selected prices. us, we have shown
that this is indeed a competitive equilibrium in this economy.
Since Q can be selected arbitrarily as long as the lower bound is honoured, we have indeed shown
that the competitive equilibrium prices in this economy are not determined by the production
technologies only. On the contrary, the indicated competitive equilibrium price vector is fully
determined by demand-side parameters only. 
Relationship to Leontief economies. e case of economies with uniform specialisation makes
clear that economies with an endogenous social division of labour bridge various well-studied
models in general equilibrium analysis. It is well-known from the literature on Leontief economies
that for constant returns to scale production technologies the competitive equilibrium prices are
fully determined by the production parameters in the input-output matrix (Intriligator, 1971, Section
9.2). eorem 4.3 provides a characterisation of the equilibrium prices that is similar to the ones
established for Leontief economies. erefore, an economy with uniform specialisation is eectively
equivalent to a Leontief economy with constant returns to scale.
In particular, under the assumption of perfect mobility of consumer-producers between speciali-
sations and open access to the production technologies, the social division of labour is a exible
conguration that assumes the role of properly scaling production in response to market demand as
is the case in Leontief economies with constant returns to scale. In this regard, the social division of
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labour in an economy with uniform specialisation emulates the Leontief production technologies
under constant returns to scale, in particular their scalability.
References
Aristotle (350 BCE): e Politics: A Treatise on Government, Ernest Barker (translator). Oxford
University Press, Oxford, UK, 1995 edn.
Basile, A. (1993): “Finitely Additive Nonatomic Coalition Production Economies: Core-Walras
Equivalence,” International Economic Review, 34(4), 983–994.
Blitch, C. P. (1983): “Allyn Young on Increasing Returns,” Journal of Post Keynesian Economics, 5,
359–372.
Brown, D. J. (1991): “Equilibrium Analysis with Non-convex Technologies,” in Handbook of Math-
ematical Economics, ed. by W. Hildenbrand, and H. F. Sonnenschein, vol. IV, chap. 36. Elsevier
Science Publishers, Amsterdam, e Netherlands.
Buchanan, J. M., and Y. J. Yoon (2002): “Globalization as framed by the two logics of trade,”
Independent Review, 6(3), 399–405.
Cheng, W., and X. Yang (2004): “Inframarginal Analysis of Division of Labor: A Survey,” Journal of
Economic Behavior and Organization, 55, 137–174.
De Simone, A. (1997): “Existence of Equilibria in Finitely Additive Nonatomic Coalition Production
Economies,” Journal of Applied Analysis, 3(2), 249–267.
Debreu, G. (1982): “Existence of General Equilibrium,” in Handbook of Mathematical Economics, ed.
by K. J. Arrow, and M. D. Intriligator, vol. II, chap. 15. Elsevier Science Publishers, Amsterdam,
e Netherlands.
Diamantaras, D., and R. P. Gilles (2004): “On the Microeconomics of Specialization,” Journal of
Economic Behavior and Organization, 55, 223–236.
Dixit, A. K., and J. E. Stiglitz (1977): “Monopolistic Competition and Optimum Product Diversity,”
American Economic Review, 67, 297–308.
Gandolfo, G. (2014): International Trade eory and Policy. Springer Verlag, second edn.
Gilles, R. P. (1996): Economic Exchange and Social Organization: e Edgeworthian Foundations of
General Equilibrium eory. Kluwer Academic Publishers, Boston, MA.
Hildenbrand, W. (1968): “e Core of an Economy with a Measure Space of Economic Agents,”
Review of Economic Studies, 35, 443–452.
(1974): Core and Equilibria of a Large Economy. Princeton University Press, Princeton, New
Jersey.
Intriligator, M. D. (1971): Mathematical Optimization and Economic eory. Prentice Hall, Engle-
wood Clis, NJ.
Kim, S. (1989): “Labor Specialization and the Extent of the Market,” Journal of Political Economy, 97,
692–705.
22
Krugman, P. (1981): “Intra-industry Specialization and the Gains from Trade,” Journal of Political
Economy, 89, 959–973.
(1991): “Increasing Returns and Economic Geography,” Journal of Political Economy, 99,
483–499.
(2008): “e Increasing Returns Revolution in Trade and Geography,” Nobel Prize Lecture,
pp. 335–348.
Locay, L. (1990): “Economic Development and the Division of Production between Households and
Markets,” Journal of Political Economy, 98, 965–982.
Nakahashi, W., andM.W. Feldman (2014): “Evolution of Division of Labor: Emergence of Dierent
Activities among Group Members,” Journal of eoretical Biology, 348, 65–79.
Oddou, C. (1982): “e Core of a Coalition Production Economy,” Journal of Mathematical Economics,
9, 1–21.
Plato (380 BCE): Republic. Penguin Classics, London, UK, 2007 edn.
Romer, P. M. (1986): “Increasing Returns and Long-Run Growth,” Journal of Political Economy, 94(5),
1002–1037.
(1987): “Growth Based on Increasing Returns Due to Specialization,” American Economic
Review, 77, 56–62.
Smith, A. (1776): An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations. University of
Chicago Press, Chicago, Illinois, Reprint 1976.
Sondermann, D. (1974): “Economies of Scale and Equilibria in Coalition Production Economies,”
Journal of Economic eory, 8, 259–291.
Steinegger, R. (2010): An Economic eory of the Division of Labor: From Adam Smith to Xiaokai
Yang and Inframarginal Analysis. VDM Verlag Dr. Mu¨ller, Saarbru¨cken, Germany.
Stigler, G. J. (1951): “e Division of Labor is Limied by the Extent of the Market,” Journal of
Political Economy, 59, 185–193.
Sun, G. (2012): e Division of Labor in Economics: A History, Routledge Studies in the History of
Economics. Routledge, London, UK.
Sun, G., X. Yang, and L. Zhou (2004): “General Equilibria in Large Economies with Endogenous
Structure of Division of Labor,” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 55, 237–256.
Suzuki, T. (1995): “Nonconvex Production Economies,” Journal of Economic Theory, 66, 158–177.
Toda, M. (2002): “Core and Equilibria in Non-convex Economies,” Proceedings of the Institute for
Mathematical Sciences Kokyu, 1264, 91–103.
Varian, H. A. (1974): “Equity, Envy, and Eciency,” Journal of Economic Theory, 9, 63–91.
Wen, M. (1998a): “An analytical framework of consumer-producers, economies of specialization
and transaction costs,” in Increasing Returns and Economic Analysis, ed. by K. J. Arrow, Y.-K. Ng,
and X. Yang. St. Martin’s Press, New York, NY.
(1998b): “e Dichotomy between Production and Consumption Decisions and Economic Ef-
ciency,” Paper presented at the Australian Economic eory Workshop, University of Melbourne,
Australia.
23
Yang, X. (1988): “A Microeconomic Approach to Modeling the Division of Labor Based on Increasing
Returns to Specialization,” Ph.D. thesis, Princeton University, Princeton, New Jersey.
(2001): Economics: New Classical Versus Neoclassical Frameworks. Blackwell Publishing,
Malden, Massachuses.
(2003): Economic Development and the Division of Labor. Blackwell Publishing, Malden,
Massachuses.
Yang, X., and J. Borland (1991): “A Microeconomic Mechanism for Economic Growth,” Journal of
Political Economy, 99, 460–482.
Yang, X., and Y.-K. Ng (1993): Specialization and Economic Organization: A New Classical Microeco-
nomic Framework. North-Holland, Amsterdam, Netherlands.
Yao, S. (2002): “Walrasian Equilibrium Computation, Network Formation, and the Wen Theorem,”
Review of Development Economics, 6, 415–427.
Young, A. A. (1928): “Increasing Returns and Economic Progress,” Economic Journal, 38, 527–542.
24
Appendices: Proofs
A Proof of eorem 2.6
Assume that (x∗,y∗) is a solution to the consumer-producer problem (4) for p > 0. en p ·x∗ 6 p ·y∗
and, thus, x∗ solves the standard demand problem for income level p · y∗. It remains to show that y∗
solves the income maximisation problem.
Suppose to the contrary that there is some y ′ ∈ P with p · y ′ > p · y∗. en from p > 0 there exists
some x ′  x∗ with p · y∗ < p · x ′ 6 p · y ′. Since u is monotone, it follows that u(x ′) > u(x∗), which
contradicts that x∗ solves (4). erefore, the pair (x∗,y∗) solves the two-stage problem.
Suppose that (xˆ , yˆ) solves the two-stage income maximisation and standard demand problem for
p > 0. Assume to the contrary that (xˆ , yˆ) does not solve (4) for p > 0.
en there exist some (x ′,y ′) with y ′ ∈ P, u(x ′) > u(xˆ) and p · x ′ 6 p ·y ′. Since yˆ solves the income
maximisation problem, it follows that p · y ′ 6 p · yˆ. But then the fact that u(x ′) > u(xˆ) contradicts
the hypothesis that xˆ solves the demand problem for yˆ.
B Proof of Proposition 2.8
Proof of 2.8(a): WIRSpec implies that P is bounded from above by Q = (Q1, . . . ,Q` )  0. Let
q =
∑`
k=1 z
k− > 0, then P = {y ∈ P | Q − q 6 y 6 Q } is a compact set such that P = P − R`+.
Proof of 2.8(b): Suppose P satises WIRSpec for Q = {z1, . . . , z`}. Assume now that zk− > 0 for
some k ∈ {1, . . . , `}, implying that zkm < 0 for somem , k . Since P is home-based, there is some
y ∈ P with y > zk and y > 0. is implies that y > zk , since ym > 0 > zkm . is contradicts that P
satises WIRSpec for Q. Hence, zk− = 0, showing the assertion.
Proof of 2.8(c): Suppose that P ⊂ R` satises SIRSpec for Q = {z1, . . . , z`} ⊂ P. Since all `
full specialisation production plans zk are independent, they are contained in a unique (` − 1)-
dimensional hyperplane. Hence, there exists a normal vector h = (h1, . . . ,h`) ∈ R` \ {0} and a
constant H ∈ R such that
{y ∈ R` | y = ∑k λkzk for λ = (λ1, . . . , λ`) with ∑k λk = 1 } = {y ∈ R` | h · y = H }.
In particular, h · y = H for all y ∈ ConvQ, implying that ConvQ is contained in the hyperplane.
Since 0 ∈ P implies that R`− ⊂ P, it follows from WIRSpec that
ConvQ ∩ R`− ⊂ {0}.
If 0 ∈ ConvQ, then by the SIRSpec property that P ∩ ConvQ = Q, it follows that 0 ∈ Q. is is a
contradiction. erefore, 0 < ConvQ, implying that ConvQ ∩ R`− = . is implies that h and H
can be selected such that h  0 with ∑k hk = 1 and H > 0.
We now show that He ∈ ConvQ, implying the assertion, since He  0.
Since h · He = H ∑k hk = H , there exists a vector of weights λ = (λ1, . . . , λ`) with ∑k λk = 1 and
He =
∑
k λkz
k . Letm ∈ {1, . . . , `}. Since ∑k λkzkm = H and zmm = Qm > 0, while zkm = −ykm 6 0 for
all k ,m, it follows that λm > 0. us, λ ∈ (0, 1)` with ∑k λk = 1, implying that He ∈ ConvQ.
C Proof of eorem 2.9
Since the consumer-producer problem (4) is equivalent to the two-stage problem stated in eorem
2.6, we can focus on the solution of the income maximisation problem only.
Let the production set P ⊂ R` satisfy WIRSpec. Let zk ∈ P be a full specialisation production plan
for k ∈ {1, . . . , `} such that Q ⊂ P ⊂ Q ′ where Q = {z1, . . . , z`} and Q ′ = ConvQ − R`+.
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C.1 Proof of eorem 2.9(a)
Suppose that y∗ ∈ P solves the income maximisation problem for the given price vector p > 0. en
p · y∗ > p · y for all y ∈ P. We rst claim that p · y∗ > p · z for all z ∈ Q ′.
Suppose to the contrary that there exists some z ′ ∈ Q ′ with p · z ′ > p ·y∗. From the denition of Q ′,
we can assume without loss of generality that z ′ ∈ ConvQ. us, z ′ = ∑ λkzk for some weights∑
λk = 1. en for every y ∈ P : p · z ′ = ∑ λkzk > p · y∗ > p · y. In particular, zk ∈ P for all k and,
therefore, p · z ′ > p · zk for all k . is is a contradiction, showing that p · y∗ = maxp · Q ′.
e claim implies that p · y∗ = maxp · Q ′.
Given the denition of ConvQ as a convex hull of the corner points zk , k = 1, . . . , `, and that
Q ′ = ConvQ − R`+, it follows that for at least one K : p · zK = maxp · Q ′ = p · y∗.
C.2 Proof of eorem 2.9(b)
Let P satisfy SIRSpec. Hence, P ⊂ ConvQ − R`+ as well as P ∩ (ConvQ) = Q.
With assertion 2.9(a) shown above, it follows immediately that for p > 0 a solution y∗ ∈ P to the
income maximisation problem has to be such that y∗ ∈ P ∩ ConvQ. Hence, y∗ ∈ Q.
D Proof of Proposition 2.10
Let Q(ϕ) = {ϕ(e1), . . . ,ϕ(e`)} = {φ1(1)e1, . . . ,φ`(1)e`} ⊂ P(ϕ).
To show assertion 2.10(a), suppose that all φk , k ∈ {1, . . . , `}, are convex and that to the contrary
P(ϕ) does not exhibit WIRSpec. en, in particular, there exists some labour time allocation
L = (L1, . . . ,L`) with ∑k Lk = 1 such that
y = ϕ(L) = (φ1(L1), . . . ,φ`(L`) ) < ConvQ(ϕ) − R`+.
is implies that y >
∑
k λkϕ(ek ) =
∑
k λkφk (1)ek for some well-chosen non-negative weights λ
with
∑
k λk = 1. Hence, φk (Lk ) > λkφk (1) for all k and φk ′(Lk ′) > λk ′φk ′(1) for some k ′.
For any k , by convexity of the production function φk and the fact that 0 6 Lk 6 1, we have that
φk (Lk ) = φk ((1 − Lk ) · 0 + Lk · 1) 6 Lkφk (1). Hence, with φk (1) > 0 for k = 1, . . . , `, we conclude
that Lk > λk for all k and that Lk ′ > λk ′ for k ′. Hence,
∑
k Lk >
∑
k λk = 1, which contradicts the
assumption that
∑
k Lk = 1. is completes the proof of the rst assertion.
To show assertion 2.10(b), let φk , k ∈ {1, . . . , `}, be convex and let φk ′ be strictly convex. en from
the above, P(ϕ) satises WIRSpec.
To show SIRSpec we have to prove that P(ϕ) ∩ (ConvQ(ϕ)) = Q(ϕ). Suppose to the contrary that
there exists some z ∈ [P(ϕ) ∩ (ConvQ(ϕ)) ] \ Q(ϕ). en for all k :
0 6 zk = φk (Lk ) − yk = λkφk (1)
for well-chosen y > 0 and
∑
k λk =
∑
k Lk = 1. Clearly, λk < 1 for all k ∈ {1, . . . , `}, since otherwise
z ∈ Q. Similarly, if Lk = 1 it follows that 0 6 zm = λmφm(1) = −ym 6 0, implying that λm = 0 for
anym , k . is contradicts the property that λk < 1. Hence, Lk < 1 for all k .
By convexity of φk for all k and strict convexity of φk ′ , it now follows that φk (Lk ) 6 Lkφk (1) for all
k with strict inequality for k ′. erefore, λkφk (1) 6 φk (Lk ) 6 Lkφk (1) for all k and it is strict for
k ′. From φk (1) > 0 for all k , we conclude that λk ′ < Lk ′ and λk 6 Lk for all k , contradicting that∑
k λk =
∑
k Lk = 1.
Hence, z < [P(ϕ) ∩ (ConvQ(ϕ)) ] \ Q(ϕ), implying that P(ϕ) indeed satises SIRSpec.
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E Proof of the First Welfare eorem 3.3
Let (f ,д) be a competitive equilibrium in E for equilibrium price vector p > 0. Now, suppose to
the contrary that there exists some feasible allocation (f ′,д′) such that ua(f ′(a)) > ua(f (a)) for
almost all a ∈ A and there exists some non-negligible coalition S ∈ Σ with µ(S) > 0 such that
ua(f ′(a)) > ua(f (a)) for all a ∈ S .
From the assumption that all utility functions are monotone, we may apply eorem 2.6 for all
a ∈ A. Since f (a) solves the standard demand problem for income level p · д(a) we know that by
monotonicity of the preferences p · f ′(a) > p · д(a) for almost all a ∈ A and p · f ′(a) > p · д(a) for
a ∈ S . Hence, p · ∫ f ′dµ > p · ∫ дdµ = p · ∫ f dµ.
Furthermore, since for almost all a ∈ A, д(a) solves a’s income maximisation problem for p, we
conclude that p · д′(a) 6 p · д(a). erefore, p · ∫ д′dµ 6 p · ∫ дdµ.
is implies that p · ∫ f ′dµ > p · ∫ д′dµ. With p > 0, this contradicts the feasibility of (f ′,д′),
thereby showing the assertion.
F Proof of the Second Welfare eorem 3.4
Let E = 〈 (A, Σ, µ),u,P〉 be some continuum economy and let (f ,д) be some Pareto optimal alloca-
tion in E. en for every a ∈ A we dene
Φ(a) = {x ∈ R`+  ua(x) > ua(f (a)) } (20)
Now Φ has measurable graph due to the measurability of all agents’ preferences.
F.1 Proof of eorem 3.4(a)
By local non-satiation of ua , for almost all a ∈ A, Φ′(a) = {x ∈ Φ(a) | 0 6 x 6 f (a) + e} , , where
e = (1, . . . , 1). In fact, Φ′ has a measurable graph and by Aumann’s selection theorem (Hildenbrand,
1974, eorem 1, page 54) it has a measurable selection. Since this selection is integrably bounded
by f + e , it is integrable. erefore,
∫
Φ′dµ , , implying that ∫ Φdµ , 
By a similar argument based on Denition 3.1(iii) and (iv),
∫ P dµ , . us, we may dene
F =
∫
Φdµ −
∫
P dµ ,  (21)
We now claim that F ∩ R`− = . Suppose not, then there exists some (f ′,д′) with f ′(a) ∈ Φ(a) and
д′(a) ∈ Pa such that z =
∫
f ′dµ − ∫ д′dµ 6 0. Now it is easy to check that (f ′,д′) is a feasible
allocation that Pareto improves upon (f ,д). is is a contradiction, showing the claim.
Furthermore, by Lyapunov’s theorem (Hildenbrand, 1974, eorem 3, page 62), F is a convex set. is
allows the application of Minkowski’s Separation eorem (Hildenbrand, 1974, page 38), implying
the existence of some p > 0 such that p · z > 0 for all z ∈ F.
Denem : A→ R by
m(a) = inf {p · x | x ∈ Φ(a) } > 0 (22)
By Hildenbrand (1974, Proposition 3, page 60), the functionm is measurable. Since preferences are
locally non-satiated, for every n ∈ N there exists an integrable selection hn : A → R`+ of Φ with
hn(a) 6 f (a) + 1ne . Now, 0 6 m(a) 6 p · hn(a) 6 p · f (a) + 1np · e , implying thatm is integrable and
thatm(a) 6 p · f (a). Hence, ∫ mdµ 6 p · ∫ f dµ.
Next dene the measurable function by I (a) = sup p · Pa > p · д(a) > 0. Since P satises Denition
3.1 (iv), it follows that I is integrably bounded and, therefore, an integrable function.
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We now introduce the transfer function τ : A→ R by τ (a) = I (a) −m(a) for every a ∈ A, which is
consequently integrable. It follows from the feasibility of (f ,д) that∫
τ dµ =
∫
(I −m)dµ > p ·
∫
(д − f )dµ = 0
Now from Hildenbrand (1974, Proposition 6, page 63),
0 6 inf p · F =
∫
inf {p · z | z ∈ (Φ(a) − Pa) }dµ =
∫
mdµ −
∫
I dµ = −
∫
τ dµ .
Hence,
∫
τ dµ = 0.
Let a ∈ A and x ∈ R`+ be such that ua(x) > ua(f (a)). en, by local non-satiation, for every n ∈ N
there is some xn ∈ Φ(a) with ‖x − xn ‖ < 1n . erefore,
p · xn + τ (a) > m(a) + I (a) −m(a) = I (a) = sup p · Pa (23)
Now xn → x and, obviously, p · x + τ (a) > sup p · Pa , showing (12).
is also implies that p · f (a) + τ (a) > supp · Pa > p · д(a) for almost all a ∈ A. is together with
the properties that
∫
p · f (a)dµ(a) = ∫ p ·д(a)dµ(a)—from feasibility of (f ,д)—and ∫ τ dµ = 0 leads
us to (11).
is shows the assertion stated as eorem 3.4 (a).
F.2 Proof of eorem 3.4(b)
Let p > 0 be the supporting price vector as constructed in the proof of eorem 3.4 (a) above.
From SIRSpec, Proposition 2.8(c) implies that for almost all a ∈ A there exists some za ∈ ConvPa
with za  0. Hence, with p > 0 it follows that for almost all a ∈ A :
I (a) = sup p · Pa = supp · ConvPa > p · za > 0. (24)
From Proposition 2.8(a), Pa is delimited and, therefore, I (a) = max p · Pa . Now:
Lemma F.1 For almost every a ∈ A : I (a) = maxp · Pa = p · д(a) > 0.
Proof. First, note that for every a ∈ A obviously p · д(a) 6 max p · Pa = I (a). Now suppose that
p · д(a) < I (a) for a ∈ S with µ(S) > 0. en there exists some д′(a) ∈ Pa with p · д′(a) > p · д(a) for
a ∈ A. Hence,
∆ =
∫
S
[p · д′(a) − p · д(a)] dµ > 0
By strict monotonicity there exists some f ′(a) ∈ Φ(a) with ‖ f ′(a) − f (a)‖ < ∆2 . en z ′ =
∫
f ′dµ −∫
д′dµ ∈ F and
p · z ′ = p ·
∫
f ′dµ − p ·
∫
д′dµ 6 p ·
∫
f dµ + ∆2 − p ·
∫
д′dµ <
< p ·
∫
f dµ + ∆ − p ·
∫
д′dµ =
= p ·
∫
f dµ +
(
p ·
∫
S
д′dµ − p ·
∫
S
дdµ
)
− p ·
∫
д′dµ =
= p ·
∫
f dµ − p ·
∫
дdµ = 0.
is contradicts F ∩ R`− = , showing the assertion.
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From Lemma F.1 it follows that for almost everya ∈ A : p · f (a)+τ (a) = p · f (a)−m(a)+p ·д(a) 6 p ·д(a).
Strict monotonicity of ua implies the following:
Lemma F.2 For almost every a ∈ A : p · f (a) + τ (a) = p · д(a).
Proof. Suppose that p · f (a) + τ (a) < p · д(a). en there exists some εa > 0 such that xa =
f (a) + εae ∈ R`++ such that p · xa + τ (a) = p · f (a) + εa + τ (a) < p · д(a). By strict monotonicity of
ua it holds that ua(xa) > ua(f (a)). But this contradicts the assertion of eorem 3.4(a) shown above.
is proves the lemma.
Let T = {a ∈ A | τ (a) 6 0} ∈ Σ. Since ∫ τ dµ = 0, it follows that µ(T ) > 0. Also, for almost every
a ∈ T , from Lemma F.1, p · д(a) > 0, implying that p · f (a) > 0. Using standard arguments, e.g.,
Hildenbrand (1974, page 135), it follows that onT a.e., f (a) is a ua-maximal bundle in the budget set
Ba(p) = {x ∈ R`+ | p · x + τ (a) 6 p · д(a)}. From the strict monotonicity of ua , p  0.
e arguments in Hildenbrand (1974, page 135) with p  0 now imply that, for almost all a ∈ A \T ,
f (a) is a ua-maximal bundle in the budget set Ba(p) = {x ∈ R`+ | p · x + τ (a) 6 p · д(a)} as well.
is shows the assertions in 3.4(b).
G Proof of Existence eorem 3.6
e proof follows the excess demand methodology set out in Hildenbrand (1974) and Debreu (1982)
for pure exchange continuum economies.
Preliminaries. Let X and Y be two metric spaces. By Ψ : X  Y we denote a correspondence if it
assigns to every x ∈ X some subset Ψ(x) ⊂ Y . en:
(a) Ψ is closed if for every sequence xn → x in X and every sequence yn → y in Y with
yn ∈ Φ(xn) it holds that y ∈ Φ(x).
(b) Ψ is lower hemicontinuous (lhc) if for any sequence xn → x in X and any y ∈ Φ(x) there
exists a sequence yn → y in Y with yn ∈ Φ(xn) for large enough n ∈ N.
(c) Ψ is continuous if Φ is both closed as well as lhc.
roughout we let
S =
{
p ∈ R`+
 ∑`
k=1
pk = 1
}
be the (` − 1)-dimensional unit simplex. So = S ∩ R`++ denotes the relative interior of S and by
∂S = {p ∈ S | pk = 0 for some k = 1, . . . , `} the boundary of S .
Excess demand. A correspondence Ψ : So  R` is an excess demand correspondence (Gilles,
1996, Section 6.1) if it satises the following three properties:
(a) Walras’ Law: For every p ∈ So it holds that p · Ψ(p) = 0.
(b) Regularity: e correspondence Ψ is convex-valued, compact-valued and closed.
(c) Boundary property: For some norm ‖ · ‖ on R` , for every sequence pn → p ∈ ∂S it holds
that inf{ ‖z‖ | z ∈ Ψ(pn) } → ∞ as n →∞.
Lemma G.1 – Excess Demandeorem
Any excess demand correspondence Ψ has a zero point, i.e., there exists some p∗ ∈ So : 0 ∈ Ψ(p∗).
e excess demand theorem Lemma G.1 is stated as eorem 8 in Debreu (1982, page 722). Slightly
dierent proofs are provided in Debreu (1982, page 723) and Gilles (1996, page 197).
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Properties of demand and supply. Consider the continuum economy E = 〈 (A, Σ, µ),u,P〉 as
asserted in eorem 3.6. Let a ∈ A and p ∈ S . From Denition 3.1(iii), a’s production set can
be rewrien as Pa = Pa − R`+, where P : A  R` is an integrably bounded compact valued
correspondence that has a measurable graph. Now for the income maximalisation problem (eorem
2.6) dene
∆(a,p) = argmax{p · y | y ∈ Pa} ⊂ Pa (25)
I (a,p) = max{p · y | y ∈ Pa} (26)
For the standard demand problem (eorem 2.6) we introduce
B(a,p) = { x ∈ R`+ | p · x 6 I (a,p) } (27)
Γ(a,p) = argmax {ua(x) | x ∈ B(a,p) } (28)
We summarise the properties of the various concepts introduced in the following lemmas.
Lemma G.2 e following properties hold for the income function I : A × S → R and the production
plan correspondence ∆ : A × S  R`+.
(i) For every agent a ∈ A and price p ∈ S the set ∆(a,p) ,  is compact and the generated income
I (a,p) = p · ∆(a,p) > 0 is strictly positive.
(ii) For every agent a ∈ A, I (a, ·) : S → R++ is continuous and the supply correspondence
∆(a, ·) : S  R`+ is closed.
(iii) For every price p ∈ S , the function I (·,p) : A → R++ is integrable and the correspondence
∆(·,p) : A R`+ has a measurable graph and is integrably bounded.
Proof. Let a ∈ A and p ∈ S . en the income maximisation problem on Pa for p has a solution by
standard arguments, due to continuity of u(a, ·) and compactness of the restricted production set
Pa . e generated income p · ∆(a,p) is non-negative, due to the assumption that 0 ∈ Pa .
Also, Pa = Pa − R`+ implies that I (a,p) = p · ∆(a,p).
Next, since Pa satises SIRSpec for some Qa , by Proposition 2.8(c) there exists some y ∈ ConvQa ∩
R`++. is in turn implies that I (a,p) > p · y > 0. is shows assertion (i).
Berge’s Maximum eorem (Hildenbrand, 1974, Corollary, page 30) now implies that for every
a ∈ A the function I (a, ·) is continuous on S and that the correspondence ∆(a, ·) is closed on S . is,
therefore, shows assertion (ii).
Furthermore, Hildenbrand (1974, Proposition 3, page 60) implies that for every p ∈ S the function
I (·,p) and the correspondence ∆(·,p) are both measurable on A. e integrably boundedness of P
on A implies that 0 6 I (a,p) 6 p ·Q(a) is integrably bounded as well. us, I (·,p) is integrable.
e next result completes the relevant properties for the income maximisation problem.
Lemma G.3 For every price vector p ∈ S : ∫ ∆(·,p)dµ ,  is compact and convex.
Proof. It follows from the boundedness of the restricted production set correspondence P by the
integrable function Q that there exists an integrable selection in ∆(·,p), implying nonemptiness of
the integral of ∆(·,p). Furthermore, − ∫ Q dµ 6 ∫ ∆(·,p)dµ 6 ∫ Q dµ, which implies compactness
of
∫
∆(·,p)dµ by Proposition 7 in Hildenbrand (1974, page 73).
Convexity of
∫
∆(·,p)dµ follows from the atomlessness of the probability space (A, Σ, µ) and Lia-
punov’s Convexity eorem, e.g., eorem 3 in Hildenbrand (1974, page 62).
e following properties hold for the budget correspondence B : A × So  R`+ and the demand
correspondence Γ : A × So  R`+.
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Lemma G.4 Let a ∈ A. en:
(i) e budget correspondence B(a, ·) : So  R`+ is continuous.
(ii) e demand correspondence Γ(a, ·) : So  R`+ is compact-valued and closed.
Proof. We rst show that B(a, ·) is closed on So . Take any sequence pn → pˆ in So and let xn ∈
B(a,pn). Hence, pn · xn 6 I (a,pn). So, for n large enough, pn · xn 6 I (a, pˆ) + 1.
us, (xn) is bounded and admits a convergent subsequence. Without loss of generality we may
assume that there is some xˆ ∈ R`+ : xn → xˆ . us, pn · xn → pˆ · xˆ 6 I (a, pˆ), i.e., B(a, ·) is closed.
Next we show that B(a, ·) is lhc on So . Take any pn → pˆ in So and any xˆ ∈ B(a, pˆ). en we can
distinguish two cases:
pˆ · xˆ < I (a, pˆ): en for n large enough we have that pn · xˆ 6 I (a,pn). Now take xn = xˆ for all n ∈ N
and trivially lhc is implied at pˆ.
pˆ · xˆ = I (a, pˆ): Suppose rst that I (a, pˆ) > 0. en, since I (a, ·) is continuous and pn → pˆ, we have
that I (a,pn) > 0 for n large enough. Now, due to strict positivity of the income I (a, pˆ) we can
select some x ′ < xˆ with pˆ · x ′ < I (a, pˆ) = pˆ · xˆ . Now dene for every n the hyperplane
Hn =
{
z ∈ R`  pn · z = I (a,pn) > 0 } .
Now let zn ∈ R`+ be the intersection point of the line through x ′ and xˆ with the hyperplane
Hn . en zn is unique. Now dene
xn =

zn if x ′ 6 zn 6 xˆ
xˆ otherwise
By continuity of I (a, ·) on So we have that pn · xn 6 I (a,pn) for innitely many n. Also,
I (a,pn) → I (a, pˆ) and, therefore, xn → xˆ . Hence, B(a, ·) is lhc at pˆ
Next, suppose that I (a, pˆ) = 0. en, since pˆ  0, it follows that xˆ = 0 and, by continuity,
I (a,pn) → 0 = I (a, pˆ). Now dene xn = I (a,pn)e > 0. en pn · xn = I (a,pn) implying that
xn ∈ B(a,pn). Also, xn → 0 = xˆ . erefore, B(a, ·) is lhc at pˆ as well.
To prove the second assertion of Lemma G.4, we remark that B(a, ·) is compact-valued, non-empty
valued and continuous. e continuity of the utility function ua with Berge’s maximum theorem
implies that Γ(a,p) ,  is compact for all p  0 and that Γ(a, ·) is closed on So .
Lemma G.5 For every strictly positive price vectorp ∈ So , the demand correspondence Γ(·,p) : A R`+
is integrable and
∫
Γ(·,p)dµ ,  is compact and convex.
Proof. Let p ∈ So . From Lemma G.2(iii), 0 6 ∫ I (·,p)dµ 6 p · ∫ Q dµ implying that the correspon-
dence B(·,p) : A R`+ has a measurable graph and has a nonempty integral.
Now from Proposition 3 in Hildenbrand (1974, page 60), the demand correspondence Γ(·,p) has a
measurable graph. Also, for any a ∈ A and any x ∈ Γ(a,p) it holds that
pkxk 6 p · x 6 I (a,p) implying 0 6 xk 6 I (a,p)
pk
and, therefore, Γ(·,p) is bounded from below by 0 and from above by an integrable function. Hence,
the assertion that the integral of Γ(·,p) is non-empty.
Furthermore, since Γ(a,p) is compact for all a ∈ A, Proposition 7 in Hildenbrand (1974, page 73)
implies that
∫
Γ(·,p)dµ is compact. Finally, Liapunov’s theorem and the fact that (A, Σ, µ) is atomless
imply that
∫
Γ(·,p)dµ is convex.
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Construction of an excess demand function for E: We dene Ψ : So  R` by
Ψ(p) =
∫
Γ(·,p)dµ −
∫
∆(·,p)dµ (29)
We show that the correspondence Ψ is in fact an excess demand correspondence for E.
Ψ satises Walras’ Law: For every a ∈ A and every p ∈ So : p · ∆(a,p) = I (a,p). Also, since the
utility function ua is strictly monotone, it follows with standard arguments that p · Γ(a,p) =
I (a,p). Hence,
p · Ψ(p) =
∫
[p · Γ(a,p) − p · ∆(a,p) ] dµ(a) =
∫
[ I (a,p) − I (a,p) ] dµ(a) = 0.
Ψ satises regularity: Let p ∈ So . By Lemmas G.3 and G.5, Ψ(p) is the dierence between two
non-empty, convex and compact sets, implying that Ψ(p) is non-empty, convex and compact.
Since for every a ∈ A Γ(a, ·) as well as ∆(a, ·) are closed correspondences, it follows by
Proposition 8 in Hildenbrand (1974, page 73) that
∫
Γ(a, ·)dµ(a) and ∫ ∆(a, ·)dµ(a) are closed
as well. is implies in turn that Ψ is a closed correspondence.
Ψ satises the boundary property: Let ‖x ‖ = ∑`k=1 |xk | be the regular 1-norm on R` .
Let pn → pˆ ∈ ∂S be a sequence of prices in So converging to a price vector on the boundary
of the price simplex. Dene for every a ∈ A
f n(a) = inf { ‖x ‖ | x ∈ Γ(a,pn) }. (30)
Since Γ(a,pn) is compact by Lemma G.2(i) and ‖x ‖ = ∑`k=1 xk for x > 0, it follows that
f n(a) = minx ∈Γ(a,pn )∑`k=1 xk .
By Proposition 3 in Hildenbrand (1974, page 60) and the measurability of the graph of Γ(·,pn)
it follows that f n is measurable as well. Also, from the discussion above
f n(a) 6
(∑`
k=1
1
pnk
)
I (a,pn)
and, therefore, f n is integrably bounded and, thus, integrable. Now,
inf
{
‖x ‖
x ∈ ∫ Γ(a,pn)dµ(a) } = ∫ inf {‖x ‖ | x ∈ Γ(a,pn) }dµ(a) = ∫ f n dµ .
By Fatou’s Lemma (Hildenbrand, 1974, page 46),
∫
lim inf f n dµ 6 lim inf
∫
f n dµ and, so,∫
lim inf f n dµ 6 lim inf
{
‖x ‖
x ∈ ∫ Γ(a,pn)dµ(a) } (31)
From Lemma G.2(i), I (a, pˆ) > 0 for all a ∈ A. So, by strict monotonicity of the ua , limn f n(a) =
∞. us, ∫ lim inf f n dµ = ∞ and, by (31), lim inf { ‖x ‖ x ∈ ∫ Γ(a,pn)dµ(a) } = ∞.
From Lemma G.3,
∫
∆(·,p)dµ is compact for any p ∈ S . Hence, there is some U > 0 with
‖x ‖ 6 U for all x ∈ ∫ ∆(·,p)dµ. erefore,
lim inf { ‖z‖ | z ∈ Ψ(pn) } > lim inf
{
‖x ‖
x ∈ ∫ Γ(a,pn)dµ(a) } −U = ∞.
is shows that Ψ indeed satises the boundary property.
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Proof of eorem 3.6. Above, we have shown that Ψ is an excess demand correspondence.
From Lemma G.1, it follows that there exists some price p∗ ∈ So with 0 ∈ Ψ(p∗), i.e., there exist
integrable selections f of Γ(·,p∗) and д of ∆(·,p∗) such that ∫ f dµ = ∫ дdµ. Since f (a) ∈ Γ(a,p∗)
and д(a) ∈ ∆(a,p∗), it follows that (f (a),д(a)) solves the consumer-producer problem for agent
a ∈ A at price p∗  0.
Finally, from Lemma G.2(i), I (a,p∗) = p∗ · f (a) > 0 for almost all a ∈ A. From p∗  0 it immediately
follows that f (a) > 0 for almost all a ∈ A.
H Proof of eorem 4.3
Let E = 〈 (A, Σ, µ),u,P〉 be some economy as postulated in eorem 4.3. In particular, E admits a
non-trivial competitive equilibrium (f ∗,д∗) with ∫ f ∗ dµ = ∫ д∗ dµ  0 such that p∗ > 0 is some
corresponding competitive equilibrium price vector.
Since E satises the uniform specialisation property, for every k ∈ {1, . . . , `} there exist full
specialisatuion production plans zk ∈ R` such that for almost all a ∈ A : Q ⊂ Pa ⊂ ConvQ − R`+
where Q = { z1, . . . , z` }.
en by construction Q spans an (` − 1)-dimensional hyperplane in R` . Now, due to eorem 2.6,
for every a ∈ A the production plan д∗(a) solves a’s income maximisation problem. Hence,
p∗ · д∗(a) = maxp∗ · Pa = maxp∗ · [ConvQ] = maxp∗ · Q.
Since
∫
д∗(a)dµ(a)  0 is full dimensional, that all z ∈ Q are only positive in a single coordinate,
and all agents solve exactly the same maximisation problem, namely maxp∗ · Q, it has to hold that
every z ∈ Q has to be a solution to that maximisation problem. Hence, p∗ · д∗(a) = p∗ · zk for all
commodities k ∈ {1, . . . , `}.
is shows the assertion stated eorem 4.3.
I Proof of eorem 4.8
Let E = 〈 (A, Σ, µ),u,P〉 be some economy as postulated in eorem 4.8. Assume that E admits a
non-trivial competitive equilibrium (f ∗,д∗)with ∫ f ∗ dµ = ∫ д∗ dµ  0 supported by an equilibrium
price p∗ > 0.
Assuming that E has home-based production only and satises the specialisation type property, for
every type t ∈ {1, . . . ,T } there exist Qkt > 0 for all k ∈ {1, . . . , `} such that for almost all a ∈ At :
Qt ⊂ Pa ⊂ ConvQt − R`+ where Qt =
{
Q1t e1, . . . ,Q
`
t e`
}
.
en by construction Qt spans an (` − 1)-dimensional hyperplane in R` .
Since
∫
д∗ dµ  0 is full dimensional and the total number of types is strictly less than the dimen-
sionality of the commodity space, i.e., T 6 ` − 1, there has to be at least one type tˆ ∈ {1, . . . ,T } and
at least two commodities k,m ∈ {1, . . . , `} with k ,m such that∫
Atˆ
д∗k dµ > 0 as well as
∫
Atˆ
д∗m dµ > 0.
Following the arguments developed in the proof of eorem 4.3 for the identied type tˆ , we derive
that for almost all a ∈ Atˆ : p∗ · д∗(a) = maxp∗ · Qtˆ = p∗kQktˆ = p∗mQmtˆ . is completes the proof of the
assertion.
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